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TAXING  CAPITAL  GAINS 
This  article  draws  from  the  author’s  paper  in  a 
forthcoming  Federal  Reserve  System  study  of  the 
Federal  tax  structure. 
From  the  Boston  Tea  Party  to  Proposition  13, 
taxation  has  been  a  particularly,  contentious  political 
issue  in  America.  While  there  has  been  considerable 
debate  on  taxing  income  from  capital,  there  remains 
substantial  disagreement  concerning  the  fairness  and 
economic  effects  of  specific  taxes  on  capital  income, 
especially  taxes  on  capital  gains. 
Capital  income  in  America  is  subject  to  very  com- 
plex  tax  rules.  As  a  result,  an  individual’s  capital 
income  can  be  taxed  at  either  much  higher  or  much 
lower  rates  than  are  applied  to  his  labor  income.  The 
capital  gains  tax  occupies  the  extraordinary  position 
of  contributing  both  to  relatively  low  tax  rates  on 
some  capital  income  and  relatively  high  rates  on 
other  capital  income. 
To  establish  a  perspective  for  viewing  capital  gains 
taxation,  we  will  first  review  the  concepts  of  fairness, 
economic  efficiency,  capital,  and  capital  income. 
Effects  of  capital  gains  taxes  can  then  be  examined 
in  two  steps.  The  first  involves  viewing  the  effects 
of  capital  gains  taxes  in  an  inflation-free  economy. 
The  second  step  is, to  add  the  complicating  factor  of 
inflation.  At  this  point  some  perverse  effects  of 
capital  gains  taxes  will  be  evident.  Consequently, 
potential  remedial  changes  to  tax  laws  comprise  the 
final  topic. 
PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS 
Not  surprisingly,  there  is  no  universally  accepted 
conception  of  fairness  with  which  one  can  evaluate 
any  particular  tax.  Perhaps  the  most  widely  accepted 
principle  is  horizontal  equity,  an  economic  corollary 
of  the  idea  that  any  law  should  apply  equally  to  all 
individuals.  With.  respect  to  taxation,,  horizontal 
equity  states  that  taxpayers  in  equal  economic  cir- 
cumstances  should  face  equal  tax  burdens.  While  it 
is  a  useful  necessary  condition,  horizontal  equity 
alone  would  not  ensure  a  tax  system’s  fairness.  To 
do  so  would  also  require  fair  treatment  of  unequals, 
or  vertical  equity.  Unfortunately,  even  the  simpler 
goal  of  horizontal  equity  is  not  completely  unambig- 
uous.  Moreover,  achieving  it  would  require  sub- 
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stantial  change  in  the  current  method  of  taxing  cap- 
ital  gains.  Thus  horizontal  equity  by  itself  requires 
enough  attention  so  that  the  more  complex  goal  of 
vertical  equity  is  not  systematically  addressed  below, 
even  though  many  different  concepts  of  vertical 
equity  repeatedly  surface  in  tax  analysis. 
Besides  equity,  it  is  desirable  that  a  tax  have 
minimal  adverse  impact  on  the  economy.  Most  taxes 
currently  levied  have  some  adverse  consequences;1 
a  desirable  goal  would  be  to  collect  a  given  amount 
of  revenue  with  the  least  possible  harm.  Basically, 
levying  a  tax  on  one  source  of  economic  satisfaction 
induces  people  to  shift  their  consumption  toward  un- 
taxed  sources.  This  distorted  behavior  leads  to  eco- 
nomic  inefficiency,  in  that  the  tax  distorts  individ- 
uals’  choices  of what  to  consume  and  how  to  produce. 
As  a  result,  they  enjoy  less  than  the  maximum 
attainable  economic  satisfaction. 
The  sources  of economic  satisfaction  can  be  divided 
into  three  categories:  current  consumption  of  goods 
and  services,  future  consumption,  and  leisure.  Each 
person  must  choose  the  fraction  of  time  to  spend  in 
productive  activity.  Since  productive  activity  yields 
income  in  exchange  for  leisure  this  is  equivalent  to 
choosing  between  (1)  current  and  future  consump- 
tion  and  (2)  the  amount  of  leisure.  Postponing  cur- 
rent  consumption  to  the  future,  of  course,  is  saving. 
While  some  saving  merely  takes  the  form  of  hoarding 
cash  or  commodities,  savings  can  also  be  invested  so 
that  future  production  as  well  as  future  consumption 
possibilities  are  raised.  Since  investment  involves 
formation  of  capital,  the  means  of  providing  future 
production,  the  additional  consumption  potential  from 
investing  rather  than  hoarding  can  be  regarded  as 
capital  income. 
This  potential  does  not  normally  remain  constant. 
Relative  price  changes  can  alter  capital  asset  values, 
thereby  changing  the  asset  owner’s  present  and  fu- 
ture  consumption  possibilities.  Such  asset  revalu- 
ations  are  often  referred  to  as  capital  gains  and  losses. 
Although  some  definitions  of  income  exclude  capital. 
1 If  a  tax  reduces  (increases),  production  or  consumption 
when  a  harmful  (beneficial)  externality  is  involved,  then 
the  tax  can  improve  social  welfare.  Such  taxes  are  not 
major  contributors  to  Federal  revenue,  although  some 
observers  might  put  tobacco,  alcohol,  or  gasoline  excise 
taxes  in  this  category. 
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by  J.  R.  Hicks,  “A  person’s  income  is  what  he  can 
consume  during  the  week  and  still  be  as  well  off  at 
the  end  of  the  week  as  he  was  at  the  beginning” 
(1946).  Under  this  definition,  which  will  be  em- 
ployed  below,  capital  gains  are  clearly  part  of  income. 
The  concept  of  capital  is  not  limited  to  tangible 
capital,  such  as  machines  or  structures.  Individuals 
can  also  accumulate  intangible  capital  by  limiting 
present  consumption  in  order  to  acquire  knowledge, 
skills,  and  capabilities  that  will  raise  their  future 
productivity.  Examples  of  intangible  capital  include 
formal  education,  on-the-job  training,  research,  and 
exploration  for  mineral  deposits. 
Investment  is  facilitated  by  financial  intermedi- 
ation,  through  which  people  with  productive  uses  for 
capital  indirectly  acquire  funds  from  others  who  have 
the  desire  and  ability  to  substitute  future  for  current 
consumption.  There  is  an  important  distinction  be- 
tween  real  capital  described  above,  and  financial 
capital.  The  latter  amounts  to  paper  claims  to  real 
capital  and/or  real  capital  income  embodied  in  bonds, 
common  stock,  vested  pension  benefits,  insurance 
policies,  and  the  like.  An  efficient  system  of  financial 
intermediation  directs  funds  to  the  most  productive 
investments.  Thus,  the  more  efficient  the  system  of 
intermediation,  the  more  benefit  accrues  directly  to 
savers  and  capital  users,  and  indirectly  to  workers 
(whose  marginal  product  is  raised)  and  consumers 
(who  see  an  increased  supply  of  commodities). 
TAXATION  OF  CAPITAL  GAINS  IN  THE 
ABSENCE  OF  INFLATION 
-Equity  and  efficiency  consequences  of  capital  gains 
taxes  can  be  divided  between  consequences  unique  to 
taxes  on  capital  gains,  and  consequences  resulting 
from  any  tax  on  capita‘1  income.  Both  are  examined 
in  this  section.  Some  general  consequences  of  any 
capital  income  tax  are  first  examined.  We  then  de- 
scribe  some  important  features  of  U.  S.  tax  law  and 
discuss  some  of  their  immediate  impacts.  The  final 
task  is  to  examine  the  distinct  effects  of  taxes  on 
capital  gains. 
Taxing  Capital  Income  There  is  a  clear  quali- 
tative  effect  on  economic  efficiency  of  taxing  capital 
income  :  since  capital  formation  is  a  means  of  pro- 
viding  future  consumption,  taxing  capital  income  dis- 
torts  individuals’  choices  away  from  future  consump- 
tion  toward  leisure  or  current  consumption.  That 
such  distortions  could  be  significant  is  suggested  by 
Lawrence  Summers,  who  estimated,  “the  present 
value  of  the  welfare  gain  from  a  shift  (from  capital 
income  taxation)  to  consumption  or  wage  taxation  is 
conservatively  estimated  at  5  years’  GNP”  (1978). 
Unfortunately,  the  current  state  of  the  art  forces  any 
estimates  of  relative  welfare  costs  of  different  taxes 
to  rely  on  heroic  behavioral  assumptions  and  numer- 
ous  judgmental  parameter  estimates.  Thus  any  par- 
ticular  study,  including  that  of  Summers,  can  at  most 
be  suggestive. 
Another  concern  is  whether  capital  income  tax- 
ation  is  consistent  with  horizontal  equity.  Perhaps 
the  most  common  view  is  that  economic  equals  are 
persons  who  receive  the  same  amount  of  income, 
regardless  of  its  source.  Under  that  view,  horizontal 
equity  would  require  a  taxpayer  to  pay  the  same  rate 
on  capital  and  labor  income. 
This  conventional  reasoning  has  been  challenged 
by  Martin  Feldstein  (1978),  who  argues  that  hori- 
zontal  equity  requires  capital  income  to  be  exempt 
from  taxation.  By  interpreting  economic  equals  as 
individuals  with  the  same  present  value  of  lifetime 
consumption  expenditure,  he  is  able  to  show  that 
taxing  consumption  would  tax  equals  equally.  He 
also  notes  that  a  proportional  consumption  tax  is 
equivalent  to  a  proportional  tax  on  the  present  value 
of  lifetime  income.  But  such  a  tax  is  equivalent  to 
an  annual  income  tax  only  when  the  annual  tax  is 
proportional  to  its  base,  namely  income  before  capital 
acquisition.  Accordingly,  since  a  tax  on  capital  in- 
come  violates  this  condition,  Feldstein  concludes  that 
it  is  inconsistent  with  horizontal  equity.  Box  1 con- 
tains  an  illustration  of  this  point. 
While  Feldstein’s  argument  does  cast  doubt  on  the 
conventional  horizontal  equity  assumption,  his  defi- 
nition  of  economic  equals  can  also  be  questioned.  As 
the  example  makes  clear,  his  definition  of  economic 
equality  ignores  valuable  leisure.  In  addition,  human 
capital  complicates  discussions  of  the  equity  of  taxing 
capital  income.  An  individual’s  level  of  labor  income 
results  from  effort,  human  capital,  rents  to  innate 
ability,  luck,  and  other  factors.  Any  tax  on  labor 
income  consequently  taxes  the  return  to  human  cap- 
ital.  If  other  capital  income  were  not  taxed,  new 
equity  and  efficiency  problems  would  be  created. 
Some  salient  features  of  American  tax  laws  are 
mentioned  in  Box  2  as  a  prelude  to  a  discussion  of 
the  effects  of  the  American  method  of  taxing  capital 
gains.2 
Capital  Gains  Taxes  and  Economic  Efficiency 
Adam  Smith  (1776)  described  the  importance  of  a 
saver’s  investment  choices  : 
2 The  primary  source  for  this  discussion  is  Bernard 
Greisman  (1979). 
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AN  EXAMPLE  OF  A  TAX  ON  CAPITAL  INCOME  THAT  VIOLATES 
ONE  VIEW  OF  HORIZONTAL  EQUITY 
Imagine  a  society  whose  residents  have  infinite 
lives  (this  unrealistic  assumption  keeps  the  arith- 
metic  simple  but  does  not  affect  any  qualitative 
conclusions),  in  which  the  interest  rate  remains 
constant  at  10  percent,  and  in  which  income  from 
capital  and  labor  is  taxed  at  a  20  percent  rate. 
Consider  (1)  an  athlete  who  receives  a  salary  of 
$100,000,  and  (2)  a  laborer  who  receives  $10,000 
every  year.  Because  of  declining  ability  the  athlete 
will  play  only  one  year,  investing  his  initial  earn- 
ings  and  then  living  off  income  from  capital,  while 
the  laborer  intends  to  work  and  earn  $10,000  each 
The  athlete  would  pay  a  tax  of  $20,000  on  the 
one  year’s  labor  income.  Thus  he  could  save 
$80,000,  earning  $8,000  interest  annually,  and  would 
pay  a  $1,600  annual  tax  on  the  interest  income. 
Therefore  his  interest  taxes  have  a  present  value  of 
$16,000,  and  his  combined  lifetime  taxes  would 
have  a  present  value  of  $36,000.  In  contrast,  the 
present  value  of  the  laborer’s  taxes  would  be 
$20,000.  It  can  be  seen  that  only  if  capital  income 
were  not  taxed  would  these  Feldsteinian  equals 
before  tax  have  equal  tax  obligations. 
This  example  also  illustrates  a  weakness  in 
year  (for  simplicity,  assume  that  each  receives  his 
entire  annual  salary  on  January  1).  Both  the 
athlete  and  the  laborer  have  identical  present  values 
of  lifetime  before-tax  income,  $100,000  (the  present 
value  V  of  an  infinite  income  stream  I  at  interest 
rate  r  is  V  =  I/r). 
Feldstein’s  argument.  The  athlete  can  enjoy  a 
substantially  greater  amount  of  valuable  leisure  in 
his  lifetime.  Thus  although  equal  by  Feldstein’s 
definition,  the  athlete  has  a  greater  before-tax 
access  to  sources  of  economic  satisfaction  (that  is, 
both  consumption  and  leisure)  than  the  laborer. 
Box  2 
SOME  RELEVANT  TAX  REGULATIONS 
Capital  gains  are  taxed  when  realized,  not  as 
accrued.  This  allows  taxes  to  be  postponed,  there- 
ceived,  and  retained  earnings  can  provide  capital 
by  reducing  the  present  value  of  tax  payments. 
gains  that  will  eventually  be  realized  and  taxed. 
Also,  a  person  with  a  tax  rate  which  varies  over 
Consequently,  income  from  real  capital  assets 
time  can  choose  to  realize  gains  when  the  rate  is 
owned  indirectly  through  corporations  is  taxed  at  a 
abnormally  low.  If  capital  gains  are  not  realized 
different  rate  from  capital  income  from  assets 
before  a  taxpayer’s  death,  an  estate  tax  is  levied  on 
owned  by  a  proprietor  or  by  a  partnership. 
the  market  value  of  the  asset  but  no  tax  is  assessed 
The  existence  of  intangible  capital  further  com- 
on  accrued  capital  gains. 
plicates  matters.  Business  investments  in  intan- 
Gains  from  sales  of  assets  held  one  year  or  less 
gible  capital,  for  example  research  expenditures, 
receive  more  favorable  tax  treatment  than  cor- 
are  taxed  at  the  same  rate  as  other  capital  income. 
If  assets  are  held  longer,  60  percent  of  the  gain  is 
porate  tangible  capital  investments,  since  intangible 
investment  can  often  be  counted  as  a  current  ex- 
excluded  from  the  personal  income  tax.  The  maxi- 
mum  tax  rate  on  taxable  capital  income  is  70  per- 
pense.  Income  from  personal  investment  in  human 
cent,  as  opposed  to  a  50  percent  maximum  on  tax- 
capital  that  increases  marketable  skills  is  taxed 
able  labor  income.  Due  to  the  60  percent  exclusion, 
when  labor  income  rises.  But  human  capital  that 
the  maximum  rate  on  long-term  capital  gains  is 
directly  augments  consumption  possibilities  (i.e., 
28  percent  (ignoring  for  simplicity  the  “alternative 
music  lessons  adding  to  enjoyment  of  symphony 
minimum  tax”  which  affects  very  few  taxpayers). 
concerts)  is  not  taxed. 
Different  assets  are  taxed  at  different  effective 
Some  capital  owners  are  not  required  to  pay 
rates.  Capital  gains  in  real  estate  can  be  postponed 
personal  taxes  on  capital  income.  Reserve  funds 
by  “swap  transactions,”  and  owner-occupied  homes 
of  life  insurance  companies,  pension  funds,  and 
provide  even  more  ways  to  avoid  capital  gains 
charitable  foundations  are  prominent  examples  of 
tax  exempt  institutions.  Their  tax  exemption  pro- 
taxes. 
Also,  income  from  capital  owned  by  corporations 
vides  a  strong  incentive  for  individuals  to  own 
is  taxed  at  different  rates  from  personal  capital 
stock  indirectly,  i.e.,  by  owning  obligations  of  pen- 
income.  The  existence  of  a  corporate  income  tax 
sion  funds,  rather  than  by  personal  ownership. 
in  addition  to  the  personal  income  tax  is  consistent 
Personal  taxes  on  capital  income  can  also  be  post- 
with  the  traditional  legal  view  of  a  corporation  and 
poned  if  assets  are  placed  into  individual  retirement 
its  owners  as  separate  entities. 
plans,  which  some  people  are  allowed  to  use  to  a 
The  resulting  tax  limited  extent. 
structure  is  relevant  since  ownership  of  corporate 
stock  accounts  for  a  significant  fraction  of  taxable 
Capital  losses  are  not  treated  symmetrically  with 
capital  gains. 
capital  gains.  The  maximum  loss  deduction  from 
Corporate  financial  decisions  can  affect  capital 
ordinary  income  is  $3,000  per  year;  however,  addi- 
income  taxes.  Corporate  capital  income  paid  as 
tional  losses  can  be  “carried  over”  for  possible  use 
in  later  years.  The  full  amount  of  short-term 
interest  reduces  taxable  corporate  income;  how- 
ever,  capital  income  used  for  dividends  or  retained 
losses,  and  50  percent  of  long-term  losses,  are  de- 
earnings  is  taxed  at  the  corporate  level.  Dividends 
ductible  to  that  extent.  Also,  100  percent  of  capital 
are  also  taxed  as  personal  income  in  the  year  re- 
losses  can  be  deducted  from  capital  gains  realized 
in  the  same  year. 
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find  out  the  most  advantageous  employment  for 
whatever  capital  he  can  command.  It  is  his  own 
advantage,  indeed,  and  not  that  of  the  society, 
which  he  has  in  view.  But  the  study  of  his  own 
advantage  naturally,  or  rather  necessarily,  leads 
him  to  prefer  that  employment  which  is  most  ad- 
vantageous  to  society.  .  .  .  As  every  individual, 
therefore,  endeavours  .  .  .  to  employ  his  capital  .  .  . 
that  its  produce  may  be  of  greatest  value;  every 
individual  necessarily  labours  to  render  the  annual 
revenue  of  the  society  as  great  as  he  can.  .  .  . 
[H]e  is  in  this,  as  in  many  other  cases,  led  by  an 
invisible  hand  to  promote  an  end  which  was  no 
part  of  his  intention. 
In  short,  Smith  noted  that  a  saver  seeking  his  own 
maximum  return  helps  maximize  the  social  benefit 
yielded  by  valuable  resources,  the  leisure  and  con- 
sumption  foregone  in  order  to  produce  capital. 
This  result  can  be  changed  by  a  particular  tax 
system,  however.  Since  the  taxes  described  in  Box  2 
alter  rates  of  return,  the  taxes  can  lead  investors  to 
substitute  lightly  taxed  assets  with  low  before-tax 
yields  for  more  highly  taxed  assets.  with  higher 
before-tax  yields.  Since  the  total  return  to  all  ele- 
ments  of  society  is  represented  by  the  before-tax 
yield,  the  social  return  to  capital  formation  declines 
when  such  substitutions  are  made.  The  welfare  loss 
from  tax-induced  capital  misallocation  was  estimated 
by  Patric  Hendershott  and  Sheng-Cheng  Hu  to  have 
been  $7.85  billion  in  1976-77.  Again,  the  amount  of 
judgment  necessary  to  make  such  estimates  renders 
them  suggestive  rather  than  definitive. 
The  discussion  above  did  not  take  account  of  an 
important  feature  affecting  investment,  namely  that 
the  return  to  an  investment  is  not  precisely  known 
before  the  investment  is  made.  The  risk  of  low 
returns  would  affect  investors  even  in  a  tax-free 
economy.  The  current  tax  system  changes  matters 
even  more.  When  investment  losses  are  possible, 
capital  misallocation  can  result  from  the  asymmetric 
treatment  of  gains  and  losses.  Taking  an  example, 
suppose  there  are  three  equally  likely  results  one  year 
after  investing  $1,000  in  a  new  company  :  a  gain  of 
$180,  a  gain  of  $90,  or  a  loss  of  $90.  If  investors 
financed  a  large  number  of  such  companies,  they 
would  expect  to  gain,  on  average,  $180 ·  1/3  + 
$90  ·  1/3  +  (-$90)  ·  1/3  =  $60,  a  6  percent 
before-tax  return.  With  symmetric  treatment  of 
gains  and  losses,  an  investor  in  the  50  percent  bracket 
would  expect  to  average.  $30,  a  3  percent  return. 
But  if  the  investor  had  previously  exhausted  his 
allowable  loss  deduction,  (and  expects  to  exhaust 
future  deductions)  he  would  average  .5 ·  $180  · 
1/3 +  .5  ·  $90 ·  1/3 +  (-$90)  ·  1/3 =  $15,  a 
1.5  percent  return.  Therefore,  although  on  average, 
investors  in  new  companies  might  receive  higher 
yields  than  available  from  other  investments,  limited 
deductibility  of  losses  could  direct  savers  toward 
less  risky  investments  with  lower  social  rates  of 
return. 
Suppose  that  full-loss  offset,  the  ability  to  fully 
deduct  any  losses,  were  available.  Would  taxes  then 
affect  risk  taking?  James  Tobin  (1958)  and  many 
other  writers  have  argued  that,  with  full-loss  offset,  a 
proportional  tax  would  actually  increase  personal 
risk  taking.  Defining  risk  as  the variance  of  a  se- 
curity’s  return,  Tobin  noted  that  a  proportional  tax 
would  lower  both  the  risk  and  yield  of  each  security. 
Making  special  assumptions  concerning  investor 
preferences  and  opportunities,  Tobin  was  then  able 
to  prove  his  result.  Feldstein  (1969)  pointed  out 
the  restrictiveness  of  the  basic  assumptions  by  Tobin 
et.  al.  Either  by  allowing  more  general  (and  intu- 
itively  appealing)  investor  preferences,  or  by  remov- 
ing  the  implausible  assumption  of  the  existence  of  a 
riskless  asset,  Feldstein  was  able  to  show  that  tax- 
ation  could  generate  either  greater  or  lesser  amounts 
of  risk  taking,  depending  on  unknown  parameter 
values  (such  as  those  describing  an  individual’s  mar- 
ginal  utility  of  income).  Thus  he  concluded  that  the 
effect  of  taxation  on  risk  taking  was  an  unanswered 
empirical  question. 
Feldstein  (1976)  conducted  an  empirical  study, 
using  1962  data.  Tax  laws  at  that  time  were  similar 
to,  but  not  identical  with,  current  laws.  Rather  than 
looking  at  the  risk  and  ownership  of  particular  in- 
vestments,  i.e.,  IBM  stock  versus  General  Motors 
stock,  he  studied  six  classes  of  financial  assets: 
common  and  preferred  stocks;  taxable,  municipal, 
and  savings  bonds;  and  bank  accounts.  At  this  broad 
level,  he  was  able  to  conclude  that  although  “The 
personal  income  tax  has  a  very  powerful  effect  on 
individuals’  demands  for  portfolio  assets  .  .  .  the 
portfolio  variance  of  real  pretax  one-year  rate  of 
return  is  affected  very  little  by  the  individual’s  tax 
situation.” 
There  are  many  possible  portfolio  compositions 
with  the  same  overall  level  of  risk.  Of  particular 
interest  are  portfolios  which  contain  small  innovative 
companies,  which  are  said  to  be  especially  dependent 
on  non-dividend-paying  equity  capital.  That  depen- 
dence  is  assumed  to  be  due  to  two  factors.  The  first 
is  a  typical  small  company’s  cash  flow,  which  can  be 
high  on  average  but  subject  to  wide  fluctuation, 
thereby  raising  the  possibility  of  bankruptcy  in  a 
temporarily  bad  period  if  fixed  charges  are  high. 
The  second  characteristic  is  a  high  rate  of  return  on 
investment,  making  it  desirable  to  reinvest  capital 
income  rather  than  pay  interest  and  dividends.  These 
factors  have  been  used  to  argue  for  low  capital  gains 
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As  one  investor  put  it, 
[Due  to  capital  gains  incentives]  innovation  has 
been  encouraged  and  flourished,  technological  de- 
velopment  has  been  accelerated,  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands  of  new  jobs  have  been  created,  the  economy 
has  been  stimulated  in  a  sound  and  meaningful 
manner,  exports  have  been  increased  dramatically, 
our  nation’s  standard  of  living  has  been  improved, 
the  forces  of  inflation  have  been  resisted,  and  the 
national  security  of  our  nation  has  been  enhanced.3 
Most  investors  hold  diversified  portfolios  ;  conse- 
quently,  the  risk  of  a  financial  asset  is  the  changed 
risk  of  a  portfolio  with  and  without  that  asset.  The 
widely  used  mean-variance  capital  asset  pricing 
model  explicitly  defines  this  risk.  For  example, 
Copeland  and  Weston  (1979)  wrote,  “[A]t  the  mar- 
gin,  the  change  in  the  contribution  of  asset  i  to  port- 
folio  risk  is  simply  COV  (Ri,  R  p).”  (COV  stands 
for  covariance,  Ri  is  the  return  to  owning  asset  i, 
and  R p is  the  return  on  the  rest  of  the  portfolio.)  In 
many  cases  the  earnings  of  a  particular  small  com- 
pany  will  depend  on  internal  or  local  conditions  to  a 
much  greater  extent  than  on  the  general  market 
environment.  If  so,  the  covariance  between  the  re- 
turn  to  owning  that  company’s  stock  and  the  return 
on  the  rest  of  an  investor’s  portfolio  may  well  be 
small.  Consequently,  adding  the  company’s  stock 
would  not  add  substantial  risk  to  a  diversified  port- 
folio,  even  if  that  stock  alone  was  very  risky.  Thus, 
it  is  not  clear  that  investors  need  special  tax  breaks 
to  induce  them  to  hold  risky  individual  stocks  in 
diversified  portfolios.  Also  considering  Feldstein’s 
empirical  findings  and  the  possibility  that  low  taxes 
on  capital  gains  could  favor  assets  like  gold  bullion 
or  unimproved  land  over  investment  in  corporations 
through  bonds  or  dividend-paying  stock,  the  hypoth- 
esis  that  an  optimal  amount  of  corporate  risk-taking 
requires  capital  gains  taxes  to  be  lower  than  other 
capital  income  taxes  must  be  regarded  as  unproven. 
If  a  capital  asset  appreciates  substantially,  the 
accumulated  capital  gains  tax  liability  upon  realiza- 
tion  can  deter  the  asset’s  sale.  This  is  sometimes 
referred  to  as  a  lock-in  effect,  which  is  relevant  both 
for  individual  investors  and  for  projecting  tax  reve- 
nues  under  potential  alterations  of  tax  laws.  Exam- 
ining  data  for  1973,  Feldstein,  Joel  Slemrod,  and 
Shlomo  Yitzhaki  (1978)  found  evidence  that  the 
3  Reid  W.  Dennis,  executive  vice-president,  National 
Venture  Capital  Association  in  Congressional  testimony 
(1978).  Statements  such  as  this  ignore  the  incentive  that 
low  capital  gains  taxes  give  to  hold  assets  such  as  unim- 
proved  land  or  precious  metals  instead  of  assets  which 
finance  corporate  capital  purchase  (such  as  bonds  or 
dividend-paying  stock). 
amount  of  realized  capital  gains  is  sensitive  to  mar- 
ginal  tax  rates.  In  fact,  they  argued  that  lowering 
capital  gains  taxes  would  actually  increase  tax  reve- 
nue  by  increasing  the  turnover  rate  of  corporate 
stock.  A  study  of  time  series  data  by  Slemrod  and 
Feldstein  (1978)  also  found  strong  empirical  sup- 
port  for  a  lock-in  effect.  Finally,  Yitzhaki  (1979) 
examined  the  yield  sacrificed  by  investors  due  to  the 
lock-in  effect.  Using  1962  data  he  found  that  the 
lock-in  effect  lowered  the  annual  return  of  high  tax 
bracket  investors  by  about  1½  percent.  As  would 
be  expected,  the  effect  was  weaker  in  low  brackets. 
Unfortunately,  no  studies  have  sought  lock-in  effects 
for  assets  other  than  common  stock. 
Capital  Gains  Taxes  and  Horizontal  Equity  The 
current  system  of  taxing  capital  gains  violates  hori- 
zontal  equity  in  several  respects.  First,  capital  in- 
come  received  as  realized  capital  gains  is  taxed  at 
40  percent  of  the  rate  for  other  forms  of  capital  in- 
come.  But  for  capital  assets  indirectly  owned 
through  corporations,  a  corporate  income  tax  is 
collected  on  capital  income  before  additional  taxes 
are  assessed  on  the  person  receiving  capital  gains 
(assuming  a  constant  price-earnings  ratio  and  posi- 
tive  marginal  product  of  capital,  retained  earnings 
would  necessarily  raise  the  price  of  corporate  stock). 
Thus,  while  the  capital  gains  tax  allows  commodity 
or  real  estate  holders  to  pay  lower  taxes  on  capital 
income  than  capital  owners  who  receive  interest  or 
dividends,  the  case  is  less  clear  for  recipients  of 
capital  gains  on  corporate  stock.  A  final  judgment 
would  require  knowledge  of  the  incidence  of  the 
corporate  income  tax,  an  unresolved  although  much 
debated  issue. 
In  addition,  capital  gains  are  not  taxed  until  they 
are  realized.  Since  the  owner  of  an  appreciating 
asset  can  often  benefit  without  realizing  a  gain,  cap- 
ital  gains  recipients  are  favored  over  persons  for 
whom  accrued  and  realized  incomes  are  equal.  The 
latter  class  includes  most  recipients  of  labor  income 
as  well  as  persons  earning  interest  or  dividends. 
Box  3  contains  an  extreme  example  of  the  tax- 
reducing  effect  of  taxing  only  realized  gains.  More- 
over,  taxing  only  upon  realization  especially  benefits 
owners  of  large,  well-diversified  asset  portfolios.  At 
the  same  time  that  a  portfolio  as  a  whole  can  show  a 
gain,  individual  assets  may  well  incur  losses.  The 
owner  can  then  sell  enough  assets  to  realize  the  port- 
folio  gain  by  selling  its  losers  along  with  some  other 
assets.  This  adverse  selection  could  conceivably  re- 
duce  the  owner’s  capital  gains  tax  to  zero. 
This  concludes  the  discussion  of  capital  gains  taxes 
in  an  economy  without  inflation.  In  several  ways, 
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A  TAX  AVOIDANCE  STRATEGY 
Suppose  a  corporation  receives  a  marginal  return 
r  on  its  capital  assets.  If  it  pays  this  return  to 
stockholders  as  dividends,  a  stockholder  can  keep 
his  wealth  constant  and  consume  after 
personal  taxes,  where  is  the  personal  income  tax 
rate  and  V0  is  the  stock’s  value  (for  future  refer- 
ence,  this  amount  of  consumption  will  be  labeled 
Cd).  The  corporation  can  immediately  lower  its 
shareholders’  taxes  by  reinvesting  the  income;  as- 
suming  a  constant  price-earnings  ratio,  sharehold- 
ers  can  receive  their  income  as  long-term  capital 
gains  which,  are  taxed  at  40  percent  of  the  rate  on 
dividend  income.  There  is  additional  room  for 
lowering  taxes,  however. 
With  the  corporation  reinvesting  earnings,  the 
stock  value  will  appreciate  at  the  continuously 
compounded  rate  r.  In  other  words,  at  an  instant 
of  time  t, 
(1). 
(3). 
Now  we  can  substitute  the  expression  for  Vt  in 
(1)  for  Vt  in  (2)  and  rearrange  terms,  yielding 
(4). 
Differentiating  (4)  we  can  obtain 
(5). 
Substituting  for  Lt  and  in  (3)  and  rearranging 
terms  gives 
(6). 
How  does  this  compare  with  consumption  from 
dividends,  Cd?  Remembering  that 
for  all  t,  we  get 
(7). 
Suppose  the  shareholder  can  borrow  at  the  market 
rate  of  interest  which  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to 
the  marginal  product  of  capital,  r.  We  will  exam- 
ine  the  strategy  of  having  the  shareholder  borrow 
and  consume  an  amount  equal  to  accrued  capital 
gains.  While  this  strategy  would  keep  his  net 
In  words,  if  a  stockholder  follows  the  strategy  of 
(1)  buying  stock  issued  by  a  company  which  rein-. 
vests  all  earnings  and  (2)  borrowing  and  consum- 
ing  an  amount  equal  to  accrued  capital  gains,  then 
he  can  consume  more  than’  if  he  bought  stock 
worth  (assets  minus  liabilities)  intact,  it  avoids 
capital  gains  taxes  while  generating  tax  deductions 
for  interest  paid. 
Letting  Lt  be  the  outstanding  debt  at  time  t, 
the  assumption  of  constant  net  worth  equal  to  V0 
can  be  written  as 
tax  interest  on  outstanding  debt  (1  -  )rLt,  or 
V0  =  Vt  -  Lt  (2). 
The  amount  consumed  at  an  instant  of  time,  C  b 
t , 
is  equal  to  new  borrowing,  labeled  Lt,  minus  after- 
which  paid  all  earnings  as  dividends  (in  both  cases 
keeping  net  worth  constant).  The  additional  con- 
sumption  potential  results  from  totally  avoiding 
income  tax  by  receiving  income  as  unrealized  cap- 
ital  gains.  Moreover,  the  additional  consumption 
increases  with  a  taxpayer’s  marginal  tax  rate  as 
well  as  the  length  of  time  the  stock  is  held. 
by  taxpayers  facing  high  marginal  tax  rates. 
Although  oversimplified  in  many  places,  this 
example  illustrates  how  taxing  only  on  realization 
can  create  strategies  for  tax  avoidance,  especially 
the  current  approach  to  taxing  capital  gains  con- 
tributes  to  a  system  that  can  tax  persons  with  the 
same  before-tax  income  at  different  rates.  Such  a 
system  is  inconsistent  with  horizontal  equity,  and 
can  also  lead  to  capital  misallocation.  The  next  step 
is  to  add  the  complicating  factor  of  inflation  into  the 
picture. 
INFLATION,  CAPITAL  GAINS  TAXES,  AND 
POSSIBLE  STRUCTURAL  CHANGES 
not  capital  income,  since  capital  owners’  feasible  con- 
sumption  possibilities  have  not  expanded.  Such  in- 
creases  can  be  labeled  inflation  effects  (as  opposed 
to  net  capital  revaluations  which  result  from  relative 
price  changes  and  which  do  represent  changes  in 
capital  owners’  consumption  possibilities).  The  sum 
of  net  capital  revaluations  and  inflaton  effects  can 
be  designated  gross  capital  rvaluations.4  Tax  regu- 
lations  do  not  distinguish  between  gross  and  net 
In  the  absence  of  taxes  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a 
neutral  inflation  with  no  relative  price  changes  as  all 
prices  rise  equiproportionally,  including  prices  of 
capital  goods.  By  definition  such  price  increases  are 
4In  place  of  the  terms  “gross  capital  gains”  and  “net 
capital  gains”  some  authors  use  “nominal  capital  gains” 
and  “real  capital  gains,”  respectively.  These  terms  would 
be  confusing  in  this  paper,  however,  due  to  our  earlier 
distinction  between  real  and  financial  capital. 
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gains.  Thus  the  tax  rate  on  net  capital  revaluations 
increases  with  the  rate  of  inflation. 
Using  tax  returns  from  1973,  Feldstein  and  Slem- 
rod  (1978)  examined  the  effect  of  inflation  on  capital 
gains  taxes  levied  on  common  stock  transactions. 
While  they  found  aggregate  gross  capital  gains  re- 
ported  at  $4.6  billion,  adjusting  for  inflation  con- 
verted  the  reported  gain  to  a  $900  million  net  loss. 
According  to  their  study,  the  tax  burden  was  by  no 
means  uniform.  Investors  whose  adjusted  gross  in- 
comes  were  under  $100,000  showed  a  $3.3  billion  net 
loss,  and  also  faced  capital  gains  taxes  of  $258  mil- 
lion.  Higher  income  investors,  however,  had  a  net 
gain  of  $2.4  billion,  and  a  tax  bill  for  $880  million. 
The  uneven  distribution  of the  tax  burden  can  also  be 
seen  another  way.  Of  taxpayers  who  reported  a 
$2,000-$5,000  gross  capital  gain,  half  had  a  net  gain 
in  the  same  range,  one-third  had  a  net  gain  between 
$1,000  and  $2,000,  and  one-sixth  had  either  a  net 
loss,  or  a  net  gain  less  than  $1,000. 
Interpreting  their  study  is  not  a  completely 
straightforward  matter,  however.  The  authors  only 
had  access  to  data  on  realized  gains.  Since  owners 
of  large  portfolios  can  lower  taxes  by  offsetting  gains 
and  losses,  accrued  income  can  be  substantially  higher 
than  the  realized  income  provided  by  data  from  tax 
returns. 
In  short,  inflation  can  worsen  horizontal  equity 
violations  by  the  capital  gains  tax.  Investors  who 
receive  no  net  income  may  nevertheless  face  tax 
obligations.  Moreover,  investors  in  the  same  tax 
bracket  with  the  same  net  gains  will  pay  different 
taxes  if  the  cumulative  price  level  change  differed 
over  their  holding  periods. 
Possible  Structural  Changes  Even  in  a  world 
without  inflation,  capital  gains  taxes  are  part  of  a 
tax  system  inconsistent  with  horizontal  equity,  a 
system  that  can  misallocate  the  flow  of  invest- 
ment  funds.  With  inflation,  capital  gains  taxes 
can  increase  capital  income  tax  rates  in  a  capricious 
manner.  Such  distortions  are  not  inevitable,  how- 
ever.  Changes  could  be  made  in  the  tax  laws  which 
would  either  eliminate  or  substantially  lessen  the 
worst  distortions.  One  possibility  is  taxing  an  indi- 
vidual’s  entire  capital  income  at  the  same  rate,  his 
labor  income  tax  rate.  Compared  to  the  current 
situation,  achieving  that  goal  would  improve  capital 
allocation  and  horizontal  equity  simply  by  equalizing 
tax  rates  on  capital  income.  No  judgment  is  made 
on  revenue  effects  of  proposed  changes;  rather,  an 
optimum  level  of  tax  rates  is  assumed. 
A  large  number  of  changes  are  involved  in  achiev- 
ing  the  goal  of  equal  tax  rates.  Many  are  only 
loosely  related  to  capital  gains  taxes  and  will not  be 
considered  here.  Examples  of  such  topics  are  taxing 
the  income  from  assets  such  as  owner-occupied  hous- 
ing  and  removing  the  inflation  premium  before  tax- 
ation  of  interest  income. 
Many  other  changes  are  easily  dealt  with.  Taxing 
net  rather  than  gross  capital  revaluations  could  be 
accomplished  by  adjusting  the  purchase  price  of  an 
asset  in  line  with  the  rise  in  some  price  index.  Other 
changes  could  actually  simplify  tax  computation,  in- 
cluding  treating  losses  in  the  same  manner  as  gains 
and  removing  the  60  percent  capital  gains  exclusion. 
Finally,  lowering  the  maximum  tax  rate  on  capital 
income  to  50  percent  (the  maximum  on  labor  in- 
come)  would  only  involve  changing  a  few  tax  tables. 
These  changes  move  in  the  direction  of  taxing  all 
income  at  the  same  rate. 
Some  effects  of  the  particular  changes  mentioned 
in  the  preceding  paragraph  have  been  projected  by 
Feldstein  and  Slemrod  (1978).  Applied  to  1973 
corporate  stock  transactions,  the  above  changes 
would  have  reduced  capital  gains  taxes  by  28  per- 
cent.5  Potential  tax  reductions  stemming  from  ad- 
justing  the  purchase  price  for  inflation,  allowing  full- 
loss  offset,  and  lowering  the  maximum  rate  would 
have  been  partially  offset  by  higher  taxes  from 
eliminating  the  capital  gains  exclusion.  Taxpayers 
with  adjusted  gross  incomes  above  $100,000  would 
have  faced  a  tax  increase;  however,  those  below 
$100,000  would  have  received  a  substantial  tax  cut. 
For  example,  taxpayers  in  the  $10,000-$20,000  in- 
come  range  had  capital  gains  tax  bills  for  $23  million; 
the  proposed  changes  would  have  given  them  a  $112 
million  tax  credit.  Conversely,  investors  with  in- 
comes  above  $500,000,  who  actually  had  a  $374 
million  tax  liability  would  have  had  a  $520  million 
tax  bill  with  the  proposed  changes. 
Such  changes  are  unfortunately  not  sufficient  to 
equalize  capital  income  tax  rates.  Two  major  stum- 
bling  blocks  remain  :  the  deferral  of  capital  gains 
taxes  by  assessing  taxes  only  when  gains  are  realized, 
and  the  corporate  income  tax. 
Capital  Gains  Tax  Deferral  Although  it  was 
argued  above  that  taxing  only  realized  gains  is  in- 
consistent  with  horizontal  equity,  there  are  argu- 
ments  in  favor  of  taxing  only  realized  gains.  Taxing 
5 The  authors  ignore  the  lock-in  effect  by  only  examining 
transactions  which  actually  occurred.  Also,  as mentioned 
above,  their  reliance  on  realized  rather  than  accrued  in- 
come  makes  their  results  rather  difficult  to  interpret. 
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capital  assets.  While  actively  traded  assets  such  as 
corporate  stock  or  precious  metals  are  easily  valued, 
values  of  other  assets  such  as  real  estate  or  paintings 
can  be  only  approximately  estimated,  often  at  con- 
siderable  expense.  Also,  if  an  indivisible  asset  like  a 
house  appreciates,  it  might  be  difficult  to  acquire 
funds  to  pay  taxes  on  accrued  gains. 
Despite  these  objections,  some  type  of  accrual  tax- 
ation  can  be  imagined.  Asset  owners  could  include 
end  of  year  asset  values  on  tax  returns,  which  would 
also  serve  as  the  basis  for  the  next  year’s  return.  For 
an  asset  not  priced  on  a  stock  or  commodity  ex- 
change,  alternative  values  such  as  declared  insurance 
valuations  or  local  property  tax  assessments  could 
be  used  to  check  the  reasonableness  of  an  owner’s 
estimates.  Spot  checks  and  penalties  for  underesti- 
mates  of  price  change  might  be  used  to  deter  against 
large  underestimates.  Unfortunately,  compliance 
and  enforcement  costs  could  well  be  large.  As  to 
indivisibility,  homeowners  could  arrange  to  include 
capital  gains  taxes  in  monthly  payments,  as  is  cur- 
rently  done  with  local  property  taxes.  If  only  net 
gains  were  taxed,  this  would  probably  -not  be  an 
insurmountable  burden.  Other  indivisible  assets, 
such  as  paintings,  are  presumably  owned  by  persons 
who  hold  large  diversified  portfolios,  so  that  divisible 
assets  could  be  sold  to  pay  taxes  on  appreciation  of 
indivisible  assets. 
The  Corporate  Income  Tax  In  order  to  tax  capi- 
tal  incomes  equally,  there  would  have  to  be  an  inte- 
gration  of  corporate  and  personal  income  taxes. 
Otherwise,  investment  undertaken  by  a  corporation 
would  not  be  taxed  at  the  same  rate  as  identical  in- 
vestment  undertaken  by  a  proprietor  or  by  a  partner- 
ship.  However,  there  is  no  simple  approach  to 
integration  without  major  drawbacks. 
One  approach  to  integration  would  eliminate  the 
corporate  income  tax.  Corporate  capital  income 
would  still  be  taxed  when  received  as  interest  or 
by  shareholders  as  capital  gains  and  dividends.  A 
major  drawback  is  that  many  owners  of  corporate 
stock-pension  funds,  certain  foreign  investors,  etc. 
-do  not  pay  personal  income  taxes.  To  the  extent 
that  they  own  corporate  stock,  capital  income  would 
not  be  taxed. 
To  remedy  this  defect,  it  has  been  proposed  that 
the  corporate  income  tax  be  treated  as  a  withholding 
tax.  Shareholders  would  periodically  receive  a  state- 
ment  giving  their  pro  rata  share  of  the  corporate  in- 
come  tax  paid.  On  a  shareholder’s  personal  tax 
return,  this  would  either  decrease  his  tax  liability  or 
increase  his  refund.  However,  special  features  in 
the  tax  code  such  as  the  investment  tax  credit  and 
employee  stock  ownership  plans  would  quickly  lose 
their  appeal  under  this  type  of  integration.  A  $1 
investment  tax  credit,  for  example,  would  lower  cor- 
porate  tax  payments  by  $1,  but  it  would  also  lower 
shareholders’  tax  credits  by  $1.  Thus  the  net  effect 
on  taxes  is  zero.  Consequently,  this  form  of  inte- 
gration  would  negate  the  effects  of  many  features 
that  have  acquired  vocal  constituencies. 
The  opposite  approach  would  be  to  retain  the  tax 
on  corporate  income  but  to  eliminate  personal  taxes 
on  interest,  dividends,  and  capital  gains  on  corporate 
stock  (to  the  extent  that  capital  gains  result  from 
retained  earnings).  However,  unless  a  shareholder’s 
marginal  personal  tax  rate  happened  to  equal  the 
corporate  rate,  capital  income  would  still  not  be 
taxed  at  a  rate  equal  to  each  taxpayer’s  personal  rate. 
Thus  this  form  of  integration  is  most  appropriate 
when  there  is  a  proportional  personal  tax  system, 
A  variation  on  this  theme  would  add  an  individual 
stockholder’s  share  of  taxable  corporate  profits  to 
his  taxable  personal  income  while  treating  his  share 
of the  corporate  income  tax  as  personal  tax  withheld. 
Thus  low  income  shareholders  would  receive  refunds 
while  high  income  shareholders  would  have  to  pay 
additional  taxes.  A  drawback  occurs  to  the  extent 
that  a corporation’s  ultimate  tax  payment  differs  from 
its  first  estimate,  thereby  causing  intertemporal  in- 
equity  among  shareholders.  Nevertheless,  objections 
to  this  form  of  integration  appear  less  persuasive 
than  objections  to  either  the  current  system  or  other 
methods  of  integration. 
CONCLUSION 
The  capital  gains  tax  plays  a  key  role  in  a  tax 
system  which  taxes  different  forms  of  capital  income 
at  widely  varying  rates.  While  this  conclusion  is 
true  without  regard  to  the  price  level,  inflation  results 
in  taxes  on  spurious  capital  gains,  thereby  worsening 
an  already  questionable  tax  structure. 
There  are  changes  which  could  make  tax  rates  on 
income  from  different  sources  more  equal.  The 
existence  of  such  changes  does  not  mean  that  im- 
mediate  change  is  necessarily  desirable,  however. 
Current  capital  asset  values  are  based  on  the  cur- 
rent  tax  structure.  Unanticipated  changes,  including 
those  mentioned  above,  would  alter  asset  values  and 
would  injure  many  asset  holders.  To  ameliorate 
such  losses  might  require  a  lengthy  phase-in  period 
for  tax  changes. 
That,  in  turn,  leads  to  another  cost  of  change. 
The  changes  discussed  above  might  well  substantially 
increase  the  burden  of  tax  preparation  and  collection. 
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burden. 
Thus  we  conclude  on  an  ambiguous  note.  While 
capital  gains  taxes  are  imperfect  with  respect  to 
horizontal  equity  and  economic  efficiency,  substantial 
changes  would  be  necessary  to  approach  those.  goals. 
In  light  of  our  highly  uncertain  estimates  of  the 
magnitudes  of  costs  and  benefits  of  change,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  an  admittedly  imperfect  tax  structure 
has  endured  for  many  years. 
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